State of Utah v. Carol S. Candelaria : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
State of Utah v. Carol S. Candelaria : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Candelaria, No. 900341 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2735
cou£ o**
1 
50 
sllS^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CAROL S. CANDELARIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900341-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for "Fraudulently 
Obtaining Welfare Assistance, " a second degree felony, in violation 
of Section 55-15a-31(l), 1985 and 1986, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, 
presiding. 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR. 
431 South 300 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 
Attorney for Appellee FILED 
DEC 2 11990 
Mary T. Nconan 
r.terk of the Court 
I l l Il 'III'III II ll«: I I I Ill' I l l I I 1 I  III II "«l" III' I 1 Ill'1111 1'PNAl.S 
THE STATE OF 1 7TAH 
' • I J a I i i t i I: 1: 1 i p p e ] ] e e , 
v s 
A. 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case N< » 900341 CA 
Prior i ty No. 2 . . 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from » judgment and conviction for "Fraudulently 
Obtaining Welfare Assistance " a second degree felony, iolation 
'-•
 S
'?J* w uue Annotated ( 
i.- amended), Judicial District Court and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, Judge, 
pj.es id nig. 
JOSEPH C. FRATTO, JR 
431 South 300 East #101 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 2 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 8 
POINT I 
DID EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW 
REQUIRE THE COURT TO SENTENCE APPELLANT TO 
THE PENALTY OF A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR? 9 
POINT II 
WAS APPELLANT DENIED HER RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF FAILING TO OBJECT 
TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION AND THE RECITATION OF 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS? . . 13 
A. DOES THE INFORMATION FAIL TO STATE AN OFFENSE 
ENTITLING APPELLANT TO REVERSAL? 15 
B. DOES THE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION 
MISSTATE THE LAW? 17 
CONCLUSION 18 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases cited 
Dougherty v. State, 471 P.2d 212 (Nevada 1970) 17 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 14 
People v. Pujoue, 320 N.E. 78 (Illinois 1974) 16 
State v. Braun, 787 P.2d 1336 (Utah App. 1990) 15 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 11, 12 
State v. Garcia, 774 P. 2d 1029 (Utah App. 1987) . . . . 15, 16 
State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2nd 326, 327 (Utah App.) 
cert, denied, 782 P. 2nd 878 (Utah 1989) 2 
State v. Lane, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980) 17 
State v. Miller, 565 P. 2d 228 (Kansas 1977) 17 
State v. Moritzsky, 771 P. 2d 688 (Ut. App. 1989) 14 
State v. Roberts, 711 P 2d 235 (Utah 1985) 17 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) 10 
State v. Twitchell, 333 P. 2d 1075 (Utah 1959) 11 
Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984) 14 
Thomas v. State, 522 P. 2d 528 (Alaska 1974) 17 
United States v. Cronic, 446 U.S. 648 (1984) 14 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI 13, 14 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV . . . . 11, 15 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 7 13 
ii 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12 11 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-15a-30, (1953 as amended) 
2, 9, 12, 13, 16 
Utah Code Annotated Section 55-15a-31(1), (1953 as amended) 
(R. 6; R. 126) 2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 16 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 77, Chapter 35, Section 26(2)(a) 
(1953 as amended) 1 
Utah Code Annotated, Title 78, Chapter 2a, Section 3(2)(j)(e), 
(1953 as amended) 1 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CAROL S. CANDELARIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No, 900341-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 77-35-26(2)(a)(1953 as amended) and Utah Code Annotated 
78-2a-3(2)(j)(e), (1953 as amended) whereby the defendant in a 
criminal action may take an appeal from a final judgment and 
conviction in this court for matters concerning criminal 
convictions less than first degree felonies. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was Appellant entitled to be sentenced and punished for 
a misdemeanor rather than as a felony? 
2. Was counsel for appellant ineffective for failing to 
object to the Information and jury instruction concerning elements 
in this case. 
A. Did the Information filed in the matter fail to 
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state an offense and was otherwise deficient in informing appellant 
of the crime with which she was charged? 
B. Did the jury instruction concerning elements 
misstate the correct elements of the offense? 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of those statutes and constitutional provisions that 
do not appear in the body of the brief are included in Appendix A. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
These issues are questions of law, which are granted no 
deference on review, but the conviction is reversed if incorrect. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P. 2nd 326, 327 (Utah App. ) cert, denied, 782 
P. 2nd 878 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of fraudulently obtaining 
welfare assistance, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 55-15a-31(l) (1953 as amended) (R. 6; R. 
126). 
At the close of the State's case, counsel moved to dismiss the 
matter on the grounds that the State had not presented sufficient 
evidence (T. 251). In the alternative, it was argued that the 
Court should reduce the charge from a second degree felony, 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 55-15a-31(1), (1953 as 
amended) to a class B misdemeanor, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
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Section 55-153-30, (1953 as amended), and because the two statutes 
prohibited the same conduct and appellant was entitled to the 
lesser penalty (T. 251, 252, 258-259). 
Counsel for appellant failed to object to the sufficiency of 
the Information filed in the above matter and to the elements jury 
instruction. Such failure constituted the ineffective assistance 
of counsel. The sentence of appellant was suspended and she was 
placed on probation by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was charged in an Information with a violation of 
Utah Code Annotated Section 55-15a-31(l) (1953 as amended) and 
accused of making false statements to the State of Utah, Assistance 
Payments Administration, in that she failed to report assets and 
income which would have effected her eligibility for public 
assistance. She then received public assistance that had been 
miscalculated as a result of these omissions of fact which 
represented an overpayment to her. 
Linda Hirst presented evidence that appellant had received 
$5,375.00 in AFDC payments from September 1985 through November 
1986 (T. 56-61). Clyde Nuzman presented evidence that appellant 
had received $2,019.00 in food stamps from September 1985 through 
November 1986 (T.63-66). LaRene S. Park presented evidence that 
appellant had received $892.45 in Medicaid from October through 
December 1985 (T. 67-70). 
Terrell Nagata presented bank records from the J.A.C.L. Credit 
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Union on three separate accounts. One account was Ms. Candelariafs 
and it had earned approximately $200.00 in interest in 1985, and 
she withdrew $3,873.65 from the account in November of 1986 (T. 70-
82). One account was Joseph Candelariaf s (appellantf s son). 
Appellant and Joseph Candelaria were authorized to withdraw from 
the account, which contained $3,068.35 in September 1985. 
$2,903.07 was withdrawn by appellant in November of 1986 (T. 83-
86). The other account was Candice Candelariafs (appellant's 
daughter). Appellant and Candice were authorized to withdraw from 
the account. $3,001.65 was withdrawn by appellant in November 1986 
(T. 86-89). Mr. Nagata indicated that the accounts may have been 
trust accounts (T. 93), that the accounts were held in the credit 
union when the credit union offered matching funds life insurance 
for deposits up to $4,000.00 and that the withdrawals from the 
accounts in November occurred when Ms. Candelaria came to the 
credit union with her mother, Doris Matsuura, and had the funds 
transferred to Mrs. Matsuurafs account (T. 93-95, 97). 
Shirley Barker presented evidence concerning appellant's 
banking at Zion's First National Bank. Two trust accounts, one for 
Candice Candelaria and the other for Joseph Candelaria, were 
subject to withdrawal by appellant and her mother (T.102-103, 116). 
The balance on both accounts in 1986 was $1,159.71 (T. 104). One 
checking account, subject to withdrawal by appellant, her mother 
and her brother, Gregory Matsuura, received numerous deposits and 
checks written to Ms. Candelaria from various parties (T. 104-114). 
The Social Security numbers on the checking account apparently 
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changed as Mr. and Mrs. Matsuura became authorized to withdraw from 
the account (T. 120). Ms. Barker indicated that the balances shown 
on the bank statements might not match those of the account holder, 
because the account holder might be deducting checks from the 
balance before they cleared the bank (T. 121). Ms. Barker did not 
know if there were penalties for withdrawal from the trust account 
funds and indicated that the checking account would be charged a 
service fee if the balance dropped below $600.00 (T. 115-118). 
Gregory Matsuura testified that his name was placed on the 
Zion's bank account so that the money would be accessible in the 
event of Ms. Candelaria's death and that he had no actual 
involvement in the account beyond that (T. 121-124). He also 
testified that his mother had created an account for him at the 
J.A.C.L. when he was a child, as she had for his brother and 
sister, and that she gave him freedom to use the money in that 
account when he got married (T. 125-126). He did not know if his 
brother had been given permission to use his J.A.C.L. account and 
indicated that he did not think that appellant had been given 
permission to use her J.A.C.L. funds (T. 126). 
Katherine Bogk testified that during 1985-1986, she employed 
appellant part-time at her beauty salon, paying her sixty percent 
(60%) of the price paid by customers and providing supplies (T. 
128-135). She indicated that appellant used her own supplies when 
she did her mother's hair. 
Melodee Williams testified as appellant's self-sufficiency 
counselor and recalled that appellant had asked her unspecified 
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questions about the assistance policies and procedures. Ms. 
Williams had not told Ms. Candelaria to refrain from reporting 
income and assets (T. 139-144). She indicated that the policies 
and procedures governing the assistance programs were hundreds of 
pages long, complex and subject to interpretations by Ms. Williams' 
supervisor (T. 147-148). 
Donna Kramer testified that those receiving assistance are 
told verbally and in writing to report all of their income, assets 
and changes in circumstances relating to their assistance 
eligibility and informed that they can be prosecuted for fraud (T. 
154-163). She indicated that the policies governing the systems 
eligibility change monthly and are hundreds of pages long (T. 170). 
Robert Banta testified that appellant was not eligible to 
receive the assistance she had received from September 1985 through 
November 1986 because of the money in the Credit Union and the 
Zion's Bank accounts and because of her employment and other income 
(T. 181-226). He indicated that if appellant has money in trusts 
which are not accessible, those funds would not be considered in 
terms of appellant's eligibility. 
In defense of appellant, her mother, Doris Matsuura, testified 
that she had opened up accounts for her three children at the 
J.A.C.L. Credit Union in 1955. The accounts were not to be used by 
the children without her consent because they were intended to 
provide life insurance benefits to them in the event of her death 
(T. 263-267). Ms. Candelaria was not authorized to use the funds 
held in her name or in the names of her children, Joseph and 
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Candice, at the J.A.C.L. Credit Union (T. 269-270). Mrs. Matsuura 
indicated that she provided $2,000.00 for appellant's checking 
account at Zion's Bank to alleviate the need for Ms. Candelaria to 
pay fees on the account and that the money was not to be used by 
Ms. Candelaria (T. 270-272). Mrs. Matsuura also testified that the 
two other Zion's Bank accounts contained her money and not that of 
appellant. In cross examination, it was apparently the State's 
position that the documents describing the bank accounts were not 
sufficiently specific to corroborate Mrs. Matsuura's testimony (T. 
273-287). 
Appellant testified that she received a $1,000.00 settlement 
from her previous employer, Wasatch Opinion Research, for work she 
had done in the past and did not report the settlement as income 
because she did not think it needed to be reported. She indicated 
that when she worked for Mrs. Bogk at the beauty salon, she was 
working one day a week for three or four hours and buying her own 
supplies. Consequently, she did not make a profit that needed to 
be reported as income (T. 293-296). She indicated that when she 
worked for Mary Kay Cosmetics, she lost money and made no income 
(T.296-297). 
Appellant indicated that when she applied for assistance as of 
September 1985, she told her assistance advisor, Peggy Harrison, 
about her mother's trust account in her and her children's names 
and was told that since the money was her mother's, Ms. Candelaria 
did not have to report it (T. 309). She indicated that she did not 
knowingly falsify anything on her assistance applications (T. 309). 
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In November 1986, when appellant was notified that she would 
be responsible for her mother's money and would have to repay the 
assistance she had received, she explained the situation to a 
different assistance counselor, who told her to have her name taken 
off the accounts (T. 311 )• She followed this instruction and 
brought letters from the J.A.C.L. and Zion's Bank to verify the 
transactions (T.311-313). 
Counsel for appellant raised no issue concerning the 
sufficiency of the Information filed against her, although 
arguments were made regarding the nature of the penalty which could 
be imposed. Instruction 11 of the instructions given to the jury 
an outline the elements of the offense. Counsel failed to object 
to that instruction. No alternative instruction was submitted by 
counsel for appellant concerning the elements of the offense. 
The Court took under advisement counsel's Motion to Dismiss 
the Information because the evidence was insufficient or, in the 
alternative, to reduce the penalty. That Motion was never 
explicitly ruled upon, however, the matter was submitted to the 
jury, there was a conviction as charged, appellant was sentenced 
accordingly. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant was entitled to be sentenced as a class B 
misdemeanor because the two sections at issue punish the same 
conduct as was alleged by the State. 
Counsel for appellant was ineffective in that she failed to 
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object to the sufficiency of the Information filed in the above 
matter and to the elements instruction outlining the offense. 
The Information was deficient because it failed to properly 
state the elements of the offense to which she was charged. The 
elements jury instruction misstated the correct elements for which 
she was charged. 
Consequently, as a matter of due process of law, equal 
protection of the law and the effective assistance of counsel, 
appellant is entitled to a reversal of her conviction. 
POINT I 
DID EQUAL PROTECTION UNDER THE LAW 
REQUIRE THE COURT TO SENTENCE APPELLANT TO 
THE PENALTY OF A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR? 
Two provisions of law were applicable to the factual 
allegations in the prosecution against appellant. Both statutes 
prohibited her conduct. Appellant had been accused of failing to 
disclose certain facts which would effect the calculation of her 
ability to receive public assistance. 
Title 55, Chapter 15a, Section 30 provides, in part, as 
follows: 
Failure to disclose certain facts 
Misdemeanor. 
(1) No person shall knowingly, by false 
statement, misrepresentation, impersonation or 
other fraudulent means, fail to disclose any 
reduction in household composition, employment 
changes, changes in marital status, receipt of 
other monetary assistance, receipt of in-kind 
gifts or an other material fact or change in 
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circumstances used in making, or which would 
affect, the determination of that person's 
eligibility to receive aid or benefits under 
any state or federally funded assistance 
program. . . . 
(3) The violation of any provision of 
this section shall constitute a class B 
misdemeanor. 
Title 55, Chapter 15a, Section 31 was the statute upon which 
the prosecution was based and provides, in pertinent part, as 
follows: 
Failure to disclose certain facts 
Criminal Penalties. 
(1) No person shall fail to disclose any 
change in circumstances, as provided in 
Section 55-15a-30, for the purpose of 
obtaining, or continuing to receive, funds or 
other benefits to which that person is not 
entitled, or in an amount larger than that to 
which he is entitled. . . . 
(7) The punishment for the offense of 
this section are as follows; 
(a) as a felony of the second 
degree if the value of the funds or 
other benefits received, mis-
appropriated, claimed, or applied 
for exceeds $1,000; 
(b) as a felony of the third 
degree if the value of the funds or 
other benefits received, 
misappropriated, claimed, or applied 
for is more than $250 but not more 
that $1,000; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor 
if the value of the funds or other 
benefits received, misappropriated, 
claimed, or applied for is more than 
$100 but not more than $250; 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if 
the value of the funds or other 
benefits received, misappropriated, 
claimed, or applied for is $100 or 
less. 
State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969) established, in 
Utah, the principle that, as a matter of equal protection under the 
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law, where there are two statutes which proscribe the same conduct, 
but provide two different penalties, a defendant is entitled to be 
sentenced pursuant to the lower penalty. (Amendment XIV, U.S. 
Constitution; Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution; Appendix 
A.) 
In State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985), the defendant was 
convicted of two counts of manslaughter. The Utah Supreme Court 
determined that the defendant should have been sentenced pursuant 
to the penalty for negligent homicide because the conduct of the 
defendant alleged by the prosecution was prohibited by both the 
manslaughter and negligent homicide provisions of the Utah Code. 
Citing State v. Twitchell, 333 P. 2d 1075 (Utah 1959), the 
Court concluded: 
". . . If the same identical facts may be used 
in prosecutions under two completely 
integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the 
other a felony (the defendant is entitled to 
the lesser penalty) Bryan at page 317; 333 P. 
2d at page 1077." 
The Court concluded in Bryan: 
". . .We cannot change the legislative policy 
with respect to the penalties embodied in the 
statutes at issue. Nevertheless, we cannot 
disregard our evenhanded application of the 
criminal laws. Equal protection of the law 
guarantees like treatment of all those who are 
similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal 
laws must be written so that there are 
significant differences between offenses and 
so that the exact same conduct is not subject 
to different penalties depending upon which of 
two statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to 
charge. To allow that would be to allow a 
form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our 
system of law." 
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Bryan, supra, at page 263. 
The thrust of the case against appellant was that she had 
failed to disclose certain facts which effected her eligibility for 
public assistance. The case was submitted to the jury on that 
basis. There were two basic defenses to that allegation. First, 
that monies held in the bank accounts need not have been reported 
because appellant did not have authorized access thereto. Income 
from employment was illusory and also need not have been reported. 
Secondly, that appellant did not intend to fail to report that 
which she needed to report. She was under a misimpression of her 
alleged obligation to report assets held in the bank accounts and 
her employment situation. 
There was evidence that appellant had received and obtained 
funds to which she was not entitled as a result of her failure to 
report material facts which would effect her eligibility. However, 
receipt of funds is not part of the definition of either of these 
applicable statutes. Rather, the difference between Section 30 and 
Section 31 is that the state must show that appellant had a purpose 
of obtaining benefits to which she was not entitled. This is the 
difference between cause and effect. The state attempted to prove 
no more in the case than that appellant knowingly made or knowingly 
omitted to make statements and provide information which would 
effect her eligibility. Both of these statutes prohibit that 
conduct. Consequently, upon appellant's conviction, she was 
entitled to the lesser penalty provided in Section 30. 
Pursuant to Section 31, the actual amount of funds received to 
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which a person was not entitled concerns only the degree of penalty 
and not the elements of the offense. Both of these statutory 
provisions include the fraudulent intent and purpose to obtain 
funds to which you are not entitled. Section 30 would also 
encompass other fraudulent intentions and purposes beyond 
attempting to obtain welfare assistance to which you were not 
entitled. The definition of a Section 31 offense is included 
within Section 30. 
Consequently, under the facts of this case, both these 
statutes prohibited appellants conduct. 
POINT II 
WAS APPELLANT DENIED HER RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF FAILING TO OBJECT 
TO THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION AND THE RECITATION OF 
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IN THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS? 
Counsel for appellant failed to pursue, by objection or 
otherwise, arguments that effected the substantial rights of 
appellant in two regards. First, there were issues concerning the 
sufficiency of the Information which was filed and informed 
appellant of that with which she was charged. Secondly, Jury 
Instruction 11 outlined the elements of the offense. That 
Instruction misstates those elements. (Amendment VI, U.S. 
Constitution; Article I, Section 7; Utah Constitution; Appendix A.) 
Argument on those two issues is set forth below. If there is 
merit thereto, then appellant is entitled to a reversal of her 
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conviction. 
In Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), pursuant to the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the United 
States Supreme Court guaranteed that a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding had a right to the assistance of counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984) and United 
States v. Cronic, 446 U.S. 648 (1984), the Supreme Court expanded 
upon that basic Sixth Amendment principle to include the concept 
that the assistance of counsel must also be effective. 
The test of whether a counself s performance is ineffective to 
the extent that a conviction in a criminal matter must be reversed, 
is twofold. There must be a showing that counsel's performance was 
deficient. That is, that counsel failed to do some act or to take 
necessary steps that would have protected the fundamental rights of 
the defendant and the fairness of the trial. There must also be a 
showing of prejudice. That is to say, that those fundamental 
rights were, in fact, effected by the deficient performance. 
In State v. Moritzsky. 771 P. 2d 688 (Ut. App. 1989) this 
Court, in reviewing a question of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, determined that a reviewing court must examine counself s 
performance to determine if it is deficient. The Court stated: 
"We must . . . determine if counsel's 
deficient performance undermines our 
confidence in the verdict against the 
defendant. Specifically, we must decide if a 
reasonable probability exists that the jury's 
verdict would have been more favorable to 
defendant had the proper instruction been 
given . . . " 
supra. at page 692 
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In this matter, the deficient performance of counsel as it 
pertains to the Information and the jury instructions is an 
explanation for the general rule that failing to object constitutes 
a waiver. If there are errors in the Information and jury 
instructions, then this Court can determine that the failure of 
counsel to object does not preclude appellant from raising the 
issues on appeal. 
Alternatively, aside from the effectiveness of counsel, the 
errors complained of were such as to constitute "plain error". 
Pursuant to this doctrine, the court can determine the merits of 
the argument See State v. Braun. 787 P.2d 1336 (Utah App. 1990). 
A. DOES THE INFORMATION FAIL TO STATE AN OFFENSE 
ENTITLING APPELLANT TO REVERSAL? 
As a matter of due process of law, if the Information fails to 
state an offense or is factually defective, appellant is entitled 
to a reversal of her conviction. (Amendment XIV, U.S. Constitution; 
Appendix A and C.) 
In State v. Garcia, 774 P. 2d 1029 (Utah App. 1987), defendant 
was charged with two counts of aggravated assault. This Court 
determined that Count I was properly supported by the evidence. 
However, Count II was defective because, in the charging document, 
it was alleged that defendant had assaulted the victim by 
threatening to do bodily injury to her brother-in-law. There was 
a factual defect in the application of the in that the definition 
of "another". The statute defining the elements of aggravated 
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assault, refers to the victim. In the Garcia matter, the threat 
had been directed to the alleged victim's brother-in-law. 
Consequently, the Information had failed to state a proper offense. 
"Where a conviction rests on an Information 
which fails to state an offense, a reversal is 
proper." 
Supra. at 1031. 
In People v. Puioue, 320 N.E. 78 (111. 1974), the defendant 
was charged with the unlawful use of weapons. The Complaint failed 
to allege that the pistol used by defendant was loaded. This was 
an essential element of the offense. Upon a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the Complaint, following defendant's conviction, the 
Court ordered a reversal. 
In this case, the elements of the offense had been improperly 
stated in the Information. The provisions of Title 55 Chapter 15a 
Section 31 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), provide that no 
person shall fail to disclose any change in circumstances referred 
to in the preceding Section 30 for the purpose of obtaining 
benefits to which that person is not entitled. The Information, 
however, although citing to the statutory provisions, alleges that 
appellant stole and converted to her own use public assistance. 
The concepts of stealing and converting are not part of the offense 
or either of these statutory provisions. Rather it is the failure 
to disclose information with a purpose of obtaining benefits which 
is the culpable conduct prohibited by this statute. 
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B. DOES THE ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION MISSTATE THE LAW? 
In a similar manner as in the Information, Jury Instruction 11 
misstates the applicable elements of the offense. The jury 
instruction uses the term "stole and converted to her own use". 
However, these are not concepts that are part of the applicable 
statutory definitions. 
In State v. Roberts, 711 P 2d 235 (Utah 1985), defendant had 
been charged with theft by deception. Although finding that the 
instruction was adequate, the Utah Supreme Court concluded, 
"the general rule is that an accurate 
instruction upon the basic elements of an 
offense is essential." 
Supra. at page 239. 
In State v. Lane, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), the defendant was 
also charged with theft by deception. The Court determined that 
the elements instruction was defective because of a failure to 
include the element of "intent". Again the Utah Supreme Court 
concluded, 
"an accurate instruction upon the basic 
elements of the offense charged is essential 
and the failure to so instruct constitutes 
reversible error." 
Supra, at page 35. 
Refer to Dougherty v. State. 471 P.2d 212 (Nev. 1970); State 
v. Miller, 565 P. 2d 228 (Kan. 1977); Thomas v. State, 522 P. 2d 
528 (Alaska 1974). 
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The instruction on the elements given to the jury was 
inaccurate and misleading for two reasons. First, it added two 
elements, stealing and converting, which are not part of the 
offense charged. Secondly, it failed to include the concept of 
failing to disclose with a purpose of obtaining assistance to which 
appellant was not entitled. The jury instruction really shifts and 
distorts the elements of the offense. Consequently, appellant is 
entitled to a reversal of her conviction (Appendix C). 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis that two statutes have proscribed the conduct of 
appellant in this manner, she is entitled to the lesser penalty, 
which is a class B misdemeanor. On the basis that either the 
Information or the elements jury instruction was inaccurate and a 
misstatement, appellant is entitled to a reversal of her 
conviction. 
Dated this
 0 / / day of / I/JY////J71* , 1990, 
JR. 
ST Defendant/Appellant 
18 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that four (4) copies of the foregoing Brief 
of Appellant were delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this day of 
December 1990, 
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APPENDIX A 
TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI. [Rights of the accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the 
State and the district wherein the crime shall have been committed, 
which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and 
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendants of 
witnesses in his own behalf to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused persons, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the 
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to 
testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall a person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
APPENDIX B 
UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED 
REPLACEMENT 
VOLUME 6A 
1985 Pocket Supplement 
Containing 
Amendments to statutes and new statutes in Titles 54 to 58 enacted since 
publication of Replacement Volume 6A through the 
1985 First Special Session of the Utah Legislature 
Edited by 
The Publisher's Editorial Staff 
THE ALLEN SMITH COMPANY 
Publishers 
1435 North Meridian Street 
Indianapolis. Indiana 46202 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 55-15a-3U 
changes in phraseology, punctuation and persons responsible for public assistance; 
style. prohibiting certain acts; providing penalties 
for violations; providing for certain matters 
Title of Act. relative to civil or criminal actions pursuant 
An act repealing and reenacting Section to Chapter 15a of Title 55; and providing that 
55-15a-24, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as the county attorney and the attorney general 
enacted by Chapter 122, Laws of Utah 1973, shall carry out the mandates set forth in 
as amended by Chapter 171, Laws of Utah Chapter 15a of Title 55. — Laws 1979, ch. 190. 
1975, and enacting Sections 55-15a-29 
through 55-15a-33, Utah Code Annotated Cross-References. 
1953; relating to improper public assistance; Office of Recovery Services, responsibility 
requiring repayment of improperly received for collecting public assistance payments to 
public assistance; providing for legal actions ineligible persons, 55-15c-4. 
and other procedures to secure such repay-
ments; providing for reimbursement by other 
55-15a-25. Appeals — Administrative review — Trial de novo in district 
court — Subpoena powers. Any applicant for, or recipient of, assistance, food 
stamps, or medical assistance, aggrieved because of a decision or delay in making 
a decision, may appeal and is entitled to reasonable notice and a hearing. The 
department through its administrative hearing examiner may, upon its own 
motion, review any decision of a local or district office and consider and determine 
any application upon which a decision has not been made within a reasonable time. 
All decisions of the administrative hearing examiner are final and binding upon 
"any local, district, or state office, except that any party may appeal an administra-
tive order to the district court and obtain a trial de novo of the matter by filing 
a petition in the appropriate district court within 30 days after receipt of notice 
of the administrative order. The department shall have the power, through its 
authorized hearing officer or office, to subpoena witnesses, but the subpoena power 
shall be limited to hearings related to federally assisted programs administered 
by the department in which subpoena power is required by the federal agency for 
approval of the state plan. 
'*' History: L. 1973, ch. 122, §25; 1981, ch. The 1984 amendment inserted "through its 
117, § 1; 1984, ch. 51, § 1. administrative hearing examiner" in the sec-
Compiler's Notes. on(* sentence; substituted "administrative 
^ The 1981 amendment added the last sen- hearing examiner" for "department" in the 
lence; and made minor changes in punctua- third sentence; and added the exception to 
tion. the third sentence. 
55-15a-29. Reimbursement to department — Interest. Whenever the depart-
ment expends public assistance or medicaid funds on behalf of a recipient for ser-
vices or supplies, for which another person is obligated to reimburse the 
department, that other person shall make such reimbursement within 60 days o l 
notification by the department. If reimbursement is not made within that period, 
and no extension of time is granted by the department, interest shall accrue on 
the unpaid balance at the rate of 8 percent per annum. 
: History: C. 1953, 55-15a-29, enacted by L. Cross-References. 
J979, ch. 190. § 2. Collection responsibility of Office of Recov-
ery Services, 55-15c-4. 
55-15a-30. Failure to disclose certain facts — Requesting payment from 
Jtecipient or family — Misdemeanor. (1) No person shall knowingly, by false 
jljgtement, misrepresentation, impersonation or other fraudulent means, fail to dis-
u s e any reduction in household composition, employment changes, changes in 
.marital status, receipt of other monetary assistance, receipt of in-kind gifts or any 
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55-15a-31 PUBLIC WELFARE 
other material fact or change in circumstances used in making, or which wc 
affect, the determination of that person's eligibility to receive aid or benefits un 
any state or federally funded assistance program. ' 
(2) No person providing service for which compensation is paid under any st 
or federally funded assistance program shall solicit, request or receive, actually 
constructively, any payment or contribution through a payment, assessment, g 
devise, bequest or other means, directly or indirectly, from a recipient of assistai 
from that program, or such a recipient's family, unless that person shall not 
the department, on a form it shall provide, of the amount of any such paymc 
or contribution together with such other information as the department m 
require, within ten days after the receipt of that payment or contribution or, 
the payment or contribution is to become effective at a future date, within ten da 
after the consummation of the agreement therefor. 
(3) The violation of any provision of this section shall constitute a class B mi 
demeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 55-15a-30, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 190, §3. 
55-15a-3L Failure to disclose certain facts — Unlawful use of food stamp 
identification cards, certificates, and public assistance warrants — Fraudu 
lent misappropriation by administrators — False claims — Criminal penalties 
(1) No person shall fail to disclose any change in circumstances, as provided u 
Section 55-15a-30, for the purpose of obtaining, or continuing to receive, funds oi 
other benefits to which that person is not entitled, or in an amount larger thai 
that to which he far she] is entitled. 
(2) No person shall knowingly^ ra a manner net provided by law;] use, transfer, 
acquire, traffic in, alter, forge, or possess any food stamp, food stamp identification 
card, certificate of eligibility for medical services, far] medicaid identification card, 
or public assistance warrant, in a manner not provided bg law. 
(3) No person, having duties relating to the administration of any state or fed-
erally funded assistance program, shall fraudulently misappropriate any funds 
[given « exchange] exchanged for food stamps, far] any food stamp, food stamp 
identification card, authorization for [the] purchase of food stamps, certificate of 
eligibility for medical services, medicaid identification cardx or other assistance [from that assistance program,] with which that person has been entrusted or of 
which [that person] he has gained possession by virtue of [that] his position. 
(4) No person shall knowingly: 
(a) file any claim for services to a recipient of benefits under any state or feder-
ally funded assistance program for services which were not rendered; far 
knowingly] 
(b) file or falsify any claim, report, or [documents] document required by state, 
or "federal law, rule, or provider agreement for unauthorized items or services 
under the program; [; knowingly] 
(c) fail to credit the state for payments received irom otner services; b *now-
«gly] 
(d) bill the recipient of benefits under the program, or the recipient's family, 
for an amount in excess of that provided by law or [regulation,] rule; or [knowingly] 
(e) receive any unauthorized payment as a result of [these] acts described in 
this subsection. 
(5) No person shall attempt to commit, or aid or abet the commission of, any 
[of the aets] act prohibited fander] by this section. 
(6) The punishment for violation of any provision of this section by an assist-
ance recipient is [to be] determined by the cumulative value of the funds or other 
benefits he received [daring the time period when] in committing frauds of a simi-
lar naturex faeew] and not by each separate instance of fraud [during the time 
y\,i luuj. 
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(7) The punishment for the offenses of this section are as follows: 
(a) as a felony of the second degreef;] if the value of the funds or other benefits 
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by any person^ exceeds $1,000; 
(b) as a felony of the third degreefe] if the value of the funds or other benefits 
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by any person^ is more than 
$250 but not more than $1,000; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor^] if the value of the funds or other benefits 
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by any person]* is more than 
$100 but not more than $250; 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor^] if the value of the funds or other benefits 
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for [by tmy person^ is $100 or less. 
History: C. 1953, 55-15a-31, enacted by L. or provider agreement" in subsec. (4) for 
1979, ch. 190, §4; L. 1981, ch. 221, §1; 1985, "any false claim"; substituted subsec (6) and 
ch.7. §1. the introductory portion of subsec (7) for 
'The violation of any of the provisions of this 
Compiler's Notes. section shall be punishable as follows:';;* 
s^ The 1981 amendment substituted "know- inserted "misappropriated, claimed, or 
jngly file or falsify any claim, report, or doc- applied" throughout subds. (7)(a) to (7)(d); 
uments required by state or federal law, rule, and made minor changes in phraseology. 
55-15a-32. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits — Repayment no 
defense to criminal action* (1) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this 
chapter, a paid state warrant made to the order of a party shall constitute prima 
facie evidence that such party received assistance funds from the state. 
^ (2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, all of the records 
in the custody of the department relating to the application for, verification of, 
issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall constitute business records 
within the meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence. 
(3) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the value of the 
benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or usual charge for similar benefits 
in the private sector. The value of an authorization to purchase food stamps, how-
ever, shall be deemed to be the difference between the coupon allotment thereon 
and the amount paid by the recipient for that allotment 
(4) In any criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the repayment of funds or 
other benefits obtained in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall constitute 
no defense to, or ground for dismissal of, that action. 
, Hiitory: C. 1953, 55-15a-32, enacted by L. 
1979, ck 190, §5. 
55-15a-33. County attorneys and attorney general to enforce act. It shall 
be the duty of each county attorney and the attorney general to carry out the 
mandates set forth in this chapter. 
h History: C. 1953, 55-15a-33, enacted by L. 
1979. cL 190. §6. 
CHAPTER 15b 
BOARD AND DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES 
S?«ion 63-55-7 provides that the Division of Family Services terminates on July 1,1989. 
* * 7 ~ ^ r Repealed: 
K35b-2;~ Definitions. 
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THE MICHIE COMPANY 
Law Publishers 
Charlottesville, Virginia 
55-15a-28. Collections under lien provisions — Excess 
property liens. 
The office of assistance payments, through the Office of Administrative 
Services of the Department of Social Services, is responsible for making collec-
tions of all funds due, or to become due, the state under § 55-15-30. 
Excess property liens required in the various programs not transferred to 
the federal government shall remain a condition of eligibility in the assis-
tance payments programs. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 122, § 28. 
55-15a-29. Reimbursement to department — Interest. 
Whenever the department expends public assistance or medicaid funds on 
behalf of a recipient for services or supplies, for which another person is 
obligated to reimburse the department, that other person shall make such 
reimbursement within 60 days of notification by the department. If reim-
bursement is not made within that period, and no extension of time is granted 
by the department, interest shall accrue on the unpaid balance at the rate of 8 
percent per annum. 
History: C. 1953,55-15a-29, enacted by L. bility of Office of Recovery Services, 
1979, ch. 190, § 2. § 55-15c-4. 
Cross-References. — Collection responsi-
55-15a-30- Failure to disclose certain facts — Requesting 
payment from recipient or family — Misde-
meanor. 
(1) No person shall knowingly, by false statement, misrepresentation, im-
personation or other fraudulent means, fail to disclose any reduction in house-
hold composition, employment changes, changes in marital status, receipt of 
other monetary assistance, receipt of in-kind gifts or any other material fact 
or change in circumstances used in making, or which would affect, the deter-
mination of that person's eligibility to receive aid or benefits under any state 
or federally funded assistance program, 
(2) No person providing service for which compensation is paid unaejr any 
state or federally funded assistance program shall solicit, request or receive, 
actually or constructively, any payment or contribution through a payment, 
assessment, gift, devise, bequest or other means, directly or indirectly, from a 
recipient of assistance from that program, or such a recipient's family, unless 
that person shall notify the department, on a form it shall provide, of the 
amount of any such payment or contribution together with such other infor-
mation as the department may require, within ten days after the receipt of 
that payment or contribution or, if the payment or contribution is to become 
effective at a future date, within ten days after the consummation of the 
agreement therefor. 
(3) The violation of any provision of this section shall constitute a class B 
misdemeanor. 
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History: C. 1953, 55-15a-30, enacted by L. Cross-References* — Sentencing for misde* 
1979, ch. 190, § 3. meanors, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
55-15a-31. Failure to disclose certain facts — Unlawful use 
of food stamps, identification cards, certificates, 
and public assistance warrants — Fraudulent 
misappropriation by administrators — False 
claims — Criminal penalties. 
(1) No person shall fail to disclose any change in circumstances, as provided 
in § 55-15a-30, for the purpose of obtaining, or continuing to receive, funds or 
other benefits to which that person is not entitled, or in an amount larger 
than that to which he is entitled. 
(2) No person shall knowingly use, transfer, acquire, traffic in, alter, forge, 
or possess any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate of eligi-
bility for medical services, medicaid identification card, or public assistance 
warrant, in a manner not provided by law. 
(3) No person, having duties relating to the administration of any state or 
federally funded assistance program, shall fraudulently misappropriate any 
funds exchanged for food stamps, any food stamp, food stamp identification 
card, authorization for purchase of food stamps, certificate of eligibility for 
medical services, medicaid identification card, or other assistance with which 
that person has been entrusted or of which he has gained possession by virtue 
of his position. 
(4) No person shall knowingly: 
(a) file any claim for services to a recipient of benefits under any state 
or federally funded assistance program for services which were not ren-
dered; 
(b) file or falsify any claim, report, or document required by state or 
federal law, rule, or provider agreement, for unauthorized items or ser-
vices under the program; 
(c) fail to credit the state for payments received from other services; 
(d) bill the recipient of benefits under the program, or the recipient's 
family, for an amount in excess of that provided by law or rule; or 
(e) receive any -unauthorized payment as a result of acts described in 
this subsection. 
(5) No person shall attempt to commit, or aid or abet the commission of, any 
act prohibited by this section. 
(6) The punishment for violation of any provision of this section by an 
assistance recipient is determined by the cumulative value of the funds or 
other benefits he received in committing frauds of a similar nature, and not by 
each separate instance of fraud. 
(7) The punishment for the offenses of this section are as follows: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the value of the funds or other 
benefits received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, exceeds 
$1,000; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the value of the funds or other 
benefits received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is more than 
$250 but not more than $1,000; 
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(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits 
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is more than $100 but 
not more than $250; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the funds or other benefits 
received, misappropriated, claimed, or applied for, is $100 or less. 
(8) The criminal penalties of this section do not apply to offenses by pro-
viders under the state's medicaid program, which are actionable under Chap-
ter 20, Title 26. 
History: C. 1953, 55-15a-31, enacted by L. "with which that person" in Subsection (3); di-
1979, ch. 190, § 4; L. 1981, ch. 221, § 1; 1985, vided Subsection (4) into introductory Ian-
ch. 7, S 1; 1986, ch. 46, § 10. guage and Subsections (4)(a) through (4)(f); 
Amendment Notes. — The 1981 amend- substituted "payment as a result of acts de-
ment substituted "knowingly file or falsify any scribed in this subsection'1 for "payment as a 
daim, report, or documents required by state result of those acts" in Subsection (4)(e); substi-
or federal law, rule, or provider agreement" in tuted "he received in committing frauds of a 
Subsection (4) for "any false claim"; substi- similar nature, and not by each separate in-
tuted Subsection (6) and the introductory por- stance of fraud" for "received during the time 
tion of Subsection (7) for "The violation of any period when frauds of a similar nature occur 
of the provisions of this section shall be punish- and not by each separate instance of fraud dur-
able as follows:"; inserted "misappropriated, ing the time period" in Subsection (6); deleted 
fUimft^ or applied" throughout Subsections "by any person" following "or applied for" in 
(7Xa) to (7)(d); and made minor changes in Subsections (7)(a), (7)(b), (7)(c) and (7)(d) and 
phraseology. made minor changes in phraseology and punc-
The 1985 amendment deleted "or she" fol- tuation throughout the section. 
lowing "to which he" in Subsection (1); in Sub- The 1986 amendment inserted "or" at the 
•addon (2), deleted "in a manner not provided end of Subsection 7(c) and added Subsection 
hy law* following "knowingly" and substituted (8). 
"medical identification card or public assis- Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
tance warrant, in a manner not provided by nies, §§ 76-3-201, 76-3-203, 76-3-301. 
law9 for "or medical identification card"; de- Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
leted "from that assistance program" before 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
55-15a-32. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits 
— Repayment no defense to criminal action. 
(1) In any <;ivil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, a paid state 
warrant made to the order of a party shall constitute prima facie evidence 
that such party received assistance funds from the state. 
(2) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, all of the records 
in the custody of the department relating to the application for, verification of, 
issuance of, receipt of, and use of public assistance shall constitute business 
records within the meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence: 
(3) In any civil or criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the value of the 
benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or usual charge for similar 
Benefits in the private sector. The value of an authorization to purchase food 
•tamps, however, shall be deemed to be the difference between the coupon 
allotment thereon and the amount paid by the recipient for that allotment. 
(4) lii any criminal action pursuant to this chapter, the repayment of funds 
w other benefits obtained in violation of the provisions of this chapter shall 
constitute no defense to, or ground for dismissal of, that action. 
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APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTION NO. \\ 
In order to find the defendant guilty of fraudulently 
obtaining welfare assistance as charged in the Information, each 
of the following elements must be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
1. That Carol Candelaria, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah; 
2. On or about the dates alleged in the Information; 
3. Knowingly, byj/^ false statement, misrepresentation, 
or other fraudulent means stole and converted to her own use 
public assistance funds by failing to disclose her income and 
the correct amount of funds held in savings and checking 
a c c o u n t s , u/rsrv - * / , /) MILL rn > ** 
_ _ . _ _ * 
If ry°u find/each and ever^ one of tfhe abov^ elements has 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant guilty as charged of the count. On the other hand, if 
you do not find each and every one of the above elements has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant not 
guilty of that count. 
000104 
R. PAUL VAN DAM #3312 
Attorney General 
TONY R. PATTERSON #5128 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: 538-1023 
ATTENTIONX CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT 
COURT—This is not a 
County Attorney case. 
Please send notices to 
the Attorney General's 
Office. 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CAROL CANDELARIA, 
DOB: 05/10/52 
Defendant. 
Bail ^Stimmftr?A 
JUDGE 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
c r8 !2S zr-sr-^5^7 - w 
/* 
The undersigned Arlene Call under oath states on 
information and belief that the defendant committed the crime of: 
FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINING WELFARE ASSISTANCE, a Second Degree Felony 
at Salt Lake County, State of Utah, during September 1# 
1985 through November 30, 1986 in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 55-15(a)-31(l), 1953, as 
amended. In that defendant Carol S. Candelaria did 
knowingly, by false statement, misrepresentation, or 
other fraudulent means steal and convert to her own use 
public assistance funds by failing to disclose 
$9,419.49 in assests available to her while collecting 
monthly financial, medical and foodstajnp benefits from 
the State of Utah. The value of the fuftcls or benefits 
received exceeds ONE THOUSAND Dollars ($1>000.00). 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Probable cause is established based on State of Utah, 
Assistance Payments Administration records which 
j^s disclose that defendant fraudulently withheld material 
facts or circumstances as noted above; based uopn 
Assistance Payments Administration!! Records which show 
that defendant received during the time period September 
1985 through November 1986 $5,375.00 in AFDC financial ' 
assistance, and $2,019.00 in food stamps, and $892.45 in 
Medical assistance to which her household was ineligible 
and based upon account records of National JACI Credit 
Union and Zions Bank. 
The victim's property is in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND 
TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX AND 45/100 Dollars ($8,286.45) and the 
victim is the State of Utah. 
T^RLENE CALL 
Affiant 
This information is Subscribed and sworn ,to before me 
based on evidence this / 0 day of y~/'j\{ , 
obtained from the 1989. / 
following witnesses: 
Melodee Williams (0C0) 
Robert Banta (OCO) 
Kathryn Shigarami (Credit Union 
Linda Hirst (Dept. of Fin.) 
Vern Tribe (HCF) 
Clyde Nuzman (FSI) 
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE 
^'
JL0 (iter-Authorized for presentment r^v\t 
and f i l i n g : 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney Genei 
?01T£/R. PATTERSM 
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General 
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